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ABSTRACT 
Irrigation tanks are one of the oldest and most important common property water resources in the 
resource-poor regions of South India. Tanks are also important from an ecological perspective 
because they serve as a geographically well-distributed mechanism for the conservation of soil, water 
and bio-diversity. Unfortunately, tank irrigation has undergone a process of rapid decline in the 
recent past, much of which can be attributed to the disintegration of traditional irrigation institutions. 
In response, people adopt various coping strategies such as migration, non-agricultural employment, 
and private tube-wells. Adoption of private coping mechanisms has serious implications for commu- 
nity coping mechanisms, i.e., for collective conservation efforts. Against this background, this study 
tries to understand the main causes of tank degradation and the complex interrelationships among 
poverty, private coping mechanisms and community coping mechanisms that affect tank perfor- 
mance. Primary and secondary data are used to estimate three regressions models: a macro model on 
tank degradation, a household-level model on collective action, and a production function incorporat- 
ing collective action as an input. 
In general, poor people are more dependent on tanks for various livelihood needs and hence they contribute 
more towards tank management compared to non-poor households. The analysis of tank degradation shows 
that there has been a decline in the performance of tanks. Population pressure is found to have accelerated the 
process of tank degradation. Though the emergence of private tube-wells contributes towards mitigating tank 
degradation within a narrow range, a continuous increase in the number of wells beyond limits exacerbates the 
process of tank degradation. This result is further validated by the micro-level econometric model of collective 
action towards tank management, which indicates that the increase in the number of private wells has a strong 
negative effect on the participation of rural communities in tank management. The size of the user group has a 
negative impact on cooperation, while the existence of traditional governance structures, such as rules for 
water allocation, promotes collective action. Wealth inequality is found to have a U-shaped relationship with 
collective action. The production function analysis shows that collective action has a positive and significant 
impact on the rice yields. Therefore, collective action is important for higher productivity and income. The 
study proposes several policy measures to revive and sustain tanks so as to provide livelihood security to the 
poor, who are the most affected by resource degradation. 
Key Words: irrigation tanks, collective action, coping mechanisms, poverty, common pool resources, 
South India 
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1. Introduction 
Poverty, low agricultural production, and natural resource degradation are severe interrelated problems 
in the less-developed areas of the tropics (Pender and Hazell, 2000). Resource degradation not only 
erodes the assets and productivity of individual households but also impoverishes entire communities 
(Narayan, 2000). In India, environmental degradation has manifested itself in the rapid rate of natural 
capital depletion as exemplified by forest degradation and soil erosion (Chopra and Gulati, 1998). To 
this one can add the problem of the degradation of common property water resources both surface 
and underground. Since common property water resources play a vital role in providing income and 
employment to rural people in many different ways, the degradation of these resources has a direct 
negative impact on the livelihoods of the poor. But it must be borne in mind that such degradation also 
poses serious environmental problems to the society and country at large in the long run. 
One of the most important common property resources in the relatively resource poor regions of South 
India is irrigation tanks. Until recently, irrigation tanks accounted for more than one third of the area 
irrigated in the South Indian states of Tamil Nadu, Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh. The tanks are 
ancient, and serve the needs of the poor. Their conservation and proper management is crucial for 
sustainable water use, soil conservation, and agricultural production in many arid and semi-arid areas. 
Tank maintenance is also important from an ecological point of view. 
Unfortunately, tank irrigation has been in a process of rapid decline over the last several decades. 
Much of this decline can be attributed to macro-economic changes and institutional failures. Traditional 
communitarian institutions have come under tremendous pressures because of state and market 
interventions, person-oriented political patronage, and political encouragement for encroachment 
(Nadkarni, 2000). Further, economic development and government subsidies for alternative forms of 
irrigation have gradually eroded the importance of tanks in agriculture. 
In response to resource degradation, people often develop both collective and individual coping 
mechanisms (Scherr, 2000). These individual and collective coping strategies, together with the group, 
resource, and household characteristics, determine the level of collective action to conserve and manage 
the tanks. The extent of collective action affects resource condition and water availability and, hence, 
has a direct bearing on agricultural productivity and household income. Thus, it is useful, for policy 
purposes, to investigate the nature of tank degradation in terms of its linkages to collective action and 
coping strategies. 
This paper is based on a study undertaken in the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu in which the nexus 
among poverty, private coping mechanisms and collective action for tank management was analyzed. 
The specific objectives of the investigation are: i) to assess the impact of macro-economic variables on 
tank degradation; ii) to analyze the relationship among poverty, tank use and distribution of tank benefits, 
and private (individual) and communal coping mechanisms adopted by rural communities to circumvent 
the problem of scarcity; iii) to assess the impact of household-level socio-economic variables, group 
characteristics, resource characteristics and institutional arrangements on the extent of collective action; 
and iv) to assess the impact of collective action on agricultural productivity. Based on an analysis of 30 
tank systems, a number of policy recommendations are offered to rehabilitate, and curtail further 
degradation of, this valuable commons resource. 
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2. The problem of dwindling tank irrigation 
Tanks are one of the oldest sources of irrigation in India, and are particularly important in South India, 
where they account for about one third of the area irrigated under rice. There are many benefits associated 
with tank irrigation. For example, tank irrigation systems are less capital-intensive and have wider 
geographical distribution than large irrigation projects. Being innumerable and small in size, they lend 
themselves to decentralized management. Moreover, tanks are especially important to marginal and 
small-scale farmers who largely depend on them. Tanks are eco-friendly they serve as flood moderators 
in times of heavy rainfall and as drought mitigating mechanisms during long dry spells (Vasimalai, et 
al., 1996). They recharge groundwater, which is a major source of drinking water for numerous rural 
and urban communities. Tank beds provide a place for forestry activities, which provide timber, fruits, 
fuel, and habitat for wildlife, particularly birds. Furthermore, fish grown in the tank water provides 
nutritious and affordable food for rural people besides being a source of income to fishermen. Thus, 
prosperity levels and size of villages in many semi-arid regions are directly proportional to the size and 
performance of irrigation tanks (Someshwar, 1999). 
In spite of these economic and ecological benefits, Tamil Nadu has witnessed over the years a diminishing 
role for tanks in the rural economy. The share of area iffigated by tanks to total irrigated area in Tamil 
Nadu has declined from about 40 percent in 1955 to less than 25 percent in 2000. This decline in tanks 
reflects many problems that beset tank irrigation. The conditions and performance of thousands of 
tanks are poor due to inadequate operation and maintenance investments, disintegration of traditional 
irrigation institutions responsible for managing tanks, heavy siltation, and private encroachments into 
tank foreshore and water spread areas (Palanisami and Balasubramanian, 1998). Large-scale development 
of private groundwater sources (wells) has also led to the neglect of tanks. Furthermore, most of the 
tanks in Tamil Nadu are located in a chain of hydrological networks called tank chains or tank cascades 
where water from upstream tanks flows to downstream tanks and so on for a large number of tanks, 
which are interconnected with one another through a feeder channel. The number of tanks in a chain 
may be as high as a few hundred thus complicating the process of sharing water from a single feeder 
channel among a group of tanks. These problems often lead to inter-tank conflicts among farmers. 
Tank management problems tend to fall into two distinct categories the problem of provision and the 
problem of appropriation. The provision problem relates to problems associated with bringing adequate 
water to the tank and making it available for use at the outlet. It involves multiple tasks such as 
conservation of the catchments, maintenance of supply channels, removal and prevention of 
encroachment into tank water spread areas, de-silting, and maintenance and repair of the bunds, surplus 
weir and sluices. Appropriation problems, on the other hand, relate to sharing of various benefits from 
tanks such as water for agriculture and non-agricultural purposes, fishes and trees grown in tanks, silt 
collected from the tank bed, and grasses and other minor benefits from tanks. 
The institutional landscape in tank-irrigated areas of Tamil Nadu varies from very weak informal water 
management mechanisms to strong formal institutional set-ups. In the case of very weak informal 
institutional set-ups almost nothing is done to improve the performance of tanks except for the formulation 
of a few ad hoc rules for sharing water, which are enforced and monitored by farmers themselves or 
through appointing common irrigators on a temporary basis. At the other extreme, there are strong 
formal institutions in some places, where management rules, water diversion from the upstream supply 
channel, the cleaning of field channels below the tank outlet, and revenue mobilization from tank 
usufructs and its utilization are clearly specified and enforced. There is a wide array of institutional 
landscapes between these two extremes, each characterized by stronger management components in 
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one or more aspects oftank management and weaker components in some other aspects. State intervention in 
tank management was initiated through the take-over of tanks by the Public Works Department during the 
latter part of British rule. The resulting loss of the community's rights over tank usufructs and the consequent 
breakdown in the traditional system of management (called 7Cudimaramath ') are often cited as a major 
cause of the neglect of tanks. 
Partly in response to the degradation in tank irrigation and the consequent decline in agriculture, rural 
communities have devised various community and private coping mechanisms to sustain their 
livelihoods. Coping strategies at the community- and household-levels depend upon a number of factors 
including institutional arrangements, distribution of land holdings, human capital availability, rural 
infrastructure, non-agricultural opportunities, access to alternative sources of irrigation, and local political 
and cultural factors. In many areas of Southern Tamil Nadu, one observes permanent / temporary 
migration of family members to distant cities and towns to tap non-agricultural opportunities. This can 
lead to a decline in labor availability at the household-level and, while reducing pressure on CPRs, this 
also reduces the dependence on and value of common pool resources such as tanks. The relative economic 
value of CPRs in the village economy is reduced if households receive remittance income from migrant 
members of the family. Secondly, rich farmers with larger farm holdings choose private solutions to 
circumvent the problem of tank water scarcity, i.e., extraction of groundwater through private wells. 
Hence, the participation of powerful sections of the rural community in the management of tanks is 
declining due to the emergence of private property rights over groundwater within the hydrological 
boundary of the common property tanks. Further, since groundwater and surface water (tank water) are 
physically interdependent, expansion of groundwater extraction by the rich may have adverse impacts 
on the poor and marginalized sectors of the community. Therefore, the extent to which rural households' 
have access to private coping mechanisms has serious implications for community coping mechanisms, 
i.e., the revival and conservation of common pool tanks through collective effort. This is one of the 
basic hypotheses that this paper seeks to test. 
3. Cooperative behaviour and private action an overview 
Though there are several studies addressing the issue of the interrelationship among the extent of 
dependence on CPRs, the social and economic heterogeneity of rural communities, and migration and 
collective action for managing the commons, there are no systematic attempts to understand these 
relationships in the context of irrigation tanks in South India. Most of the previous studies that have 
focused on problems confronting tank irrigation address below outlet issues, i.e., the appropriation 
problem. They are: water allocation and distribution within the tank command area (Palanisami and 
Flinn, 1989); modernization of tanks (Balasubramanian and Govindasamy, 1991); efficiency in crop 
production under tanks (Shanmugam, 1994); and the interaction between private wells and tanks 
(Palanisami and Easter, 1991; Janakarajan, 1993; Sakurai and Palanisami, 2001). A recent study 
(Palanisami and Balasubramanian, 1998) addresses the issue of the impact of private wells on the 
performance of tanks (measured as the ratio of area irrigated by tanks to the total registered command 
area of tank) using data collected from a cross-section of 690 tanks spread over four districts in Tamil 
Nadu. This study, however, suffers from two major shortcomings as far as tank-well interactions and 
their implications for collective action are concerned. First, it does not directly address the issue of the 
interrelationship between the whole set of private coping mechanisms available to the village community 
and its impact on collective action. Secondly, the measurement of tank performance (used as a dependent 
variable in the study) is plagued with serious problems in the presence of wells. 
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A more recent study on collective action and property rights when it comes to the irrigation tanks of Tamil 
Nadu (Palanisami, etal., 2001) attempts to investigate the relationship between property rights arrangements 
and the extent of collective action. 'Though this study has made important contributions to the measurement of 
tank performance by including non-agricultural uses of tanks, there is no systematic effort to understand the 
link between private coping mechanisms and common property resource management. There is no theoretical 
or conceptual model that has been tested and the empirical relationship between property rights and collective 
action has not been clearly addressed yet. On the whole, a careful review of past studies on tanks reveals a 
significant gap in the literature. Most studies focus on the appropriation problem (the sharing of tank water 
below the outlet) rather than the provision problem (bringing more water to the tank through collective effort) 
even though they recognize the chronic problem of the decline in tank irrigation together with a decline in 
community's interest in tanks. Those studies that address the issue of interaction between private wells and 
tanks have not focused on the other private coping strategies such as non-farm income and migration vis-à-vis 
the levels of poverty and collective action for tank management. Overall, the complex nexus among poverty, 
private coping mechanisms and collective action when it comes to tank management has not been systematically 
addressed by any of the previous researchers. This paper is an attempt to bridge this gap in tank irrigation 
literature by analyzing the factors responsible for tank degradation at macro level and to more systematically 
address the issue of the factors affecting collective action for tank management at the micro level. We also 
address the issue of the relationship between exit options and collective action. 
The hypotheses and methodology for the study were developed based on the conceptual and empirical 
works on cooperation and collective action by Baland and Platteau (1996), White and Runge (1994), 
Ostrom (1990, 2000), Wade (1988) and Agarwal (2001). A review of studies by Wade (1988), Ostrom 
(1990), and Baland and Platteau (1996) reveals that the important variables affecting collective action 
are: a) resource characteristics such as size and boundary; b) characteristics of beneficiary group such 
as size (number of users), inequality in their wealth (land, etc.), and the level of dependence of group 
members on the resource in question; c) institutional arrangements such as the procedures to devise 
rules, simplicity of rules, ease in enforcing rules and monitoring the adherence to rules; and d) the 
external environment, for instance, technology and state intervention in resource management. 
White and Runge (1994) address the issue of collective action in common property watersheds by 
conducting a set of statistical analyses to test the correlation between various socio-economic parameters 
and the extent of cooperation. They find that the physical distribution of land parcels in the watershed, 
percentage of landholders who have adopted soil conservation techniques, and the manner in which 
both landholders and non-watershed participants acquire labor are the important factors explaining 
levels of collective action. Similarly, Lise (2000) investigates the question of peoples' participation in 
joint forest management and finds that there is an increase in the participation of resource management 
and conservation when the condition of the resource (forest) is good and/or when the people's dependence 
on the resource is higher. Education levels within the family, that is, a higher level of education for the 
head of household and lower levels of education for the other members in the family, too, influence, in 
this instance positively, the probability of participation. Chopra and Gulati' s study (1998) on the nature 
of linkage between deforestation, land degradation and migration reveals that the household' s decision 
to migrate and/or to participate in common property resource management are interrelated, since it is a 
part of household' s labour allocation decision. Though this study highlights the interconnectedness of 
the decisions made with regard to migration and participation in the commons, it does not clearly bring 
out the direction of influence of migration on the participation in the management of the commons. 
Ostrom (2000) suggests that out-migation, changes in technology and factor availability, frequent dependence 
on external sources, international aid that does not take into account indigenous knowledge and institutions, 
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and an increase in corruption and other forms of opportunistic behaviour are the major threats to the survival 
and sustainability of local institutions responsible for resource management. When it comes to sustainable 
collective action vis-a-vis irrigation tanks in Tamil Nadu, too, these factors pose the real threat. For example, 
the technological factor impinges on tank management in the form of modem well-drilling and water-extraction 
technologies that promote and sustain private wells for groundwater extraction. This reduces the dependence 
on tanks for some farmers. Remittance income from migrants in a similar manner act as a private coping 
strategy that reduces the dependence on tanks while international aid that helps improve the physical structures 
of tanks has been misconceived as a solution for collective action problems' . 
Recent empirical work by Bardhan (2000) on 48 irrigation communities in Tamil Nadu is of special significance 
to the analysis offered in this paper. Bardhan (2000) investigates the factors affecting cooperation among 
households in maintaining irrigation systems using data collected from 48 irrigation cornatunities in Tamil Nadu. 
The main shortcoming of this study is that it attempts to capture the extent of cooperation through proxy 
variables such as the index of the quality of maintenance of distributaries and field channels, the absence of 
conflicts over water within a village in the last five years, and the frequency of violation of water allocation rules. 
These are, on the one hand, poor indicators of cooperation. On the other hand they are hard to measure. For 
example, it is difficult to say what is a conflict or what is meant by better or poor quality of irrigation channels. 
This is especially so when one collects data across tanks characterized by different sets of people facing 
different quality attributes of tank structures. Moreover, when alternative measures of cooperation, such as 
the actual amount of labour and money contributed for tank management, are available, the use of such vague 
proxies for cooperation becomes questionable. Further, Bardhan's is a pooled analysis of irrigation communities 
in traditional tank and modern canal irrigation systems. Hence, the results from his analysis are not specifically 
applicable in the context of tank irrigation. 
Given this background, the rest of the paper is divided as follows: Section 4 describes the study region and 
data collection methods. Section 5 presents the econometric models used to analyze tank degradation in Tamil 
Nadu and the district of Ramanathapuram and to understand collective action and its effectiveness. The results 
of the tank degradation analysis are presented in Section 6. This is followed by a discussion on poverty, 
dependence on tanks, and private coping mechanisms in section 7, and the role of village communities in the 
conservation and management of tanks in section 8. Section 9 of the paper presents the conclusions and policy 
recommendations. 
' The European Community has funded a major tank modernization project in Tamil Nadu, under which emphasis is placed 
on improvements to physical structures of the tanks rather than reviving and sustaining the institutional mechanisms for 
tank management. Little attention is paid to traditional knowledge about the conservation and management of tanks and to 
traditional institutions. 
6 Sandee Working Paper No. 2-03 
4. Description of the study region and data collection 
In attempting to understand tank degradation at the macro level, the paper first focuses on the state of Tamil 
Nadu and then on the district of Ramanathapuram in Tamil Nadu. The district of old Ramanathapuram (comprising 
present Ramanathapuram, Sivagangai and Virudhunagar districts) was selected because of the predominance 
of tank irrigation in the district as compared to the other districts in Tamil Nadu. Further, underdeveloped 
agriculture, a poor resource base, and low commercialization and industrial development make it a typical 
poor district that fits in with the objectives of the study. 
An analysis of decadal trends in the area irrigated by irrigation tanks and private wells in Tamil Nadu 
and Ramanathapuram reveals that there has been a sharp decline in the area under tank irrigation in the 
state as well as in Ramanathapuram. The share of tanks in the total area irrigated by all sources in 
Ramanathapuram declined from about 88 percent during the 1960s to 75 percent during the 1990s 
while the corresponding figures for Tamil Nadu show a decline from 37 percent to 22 percent. 
Table 1. Comparison of decadal trends in tank irrigation in Ramanathapuram district and 
Tamil Nadu 
Note: Figures in parentheses are percentages to the net irrigated area by all sources in the respective years in the respective regions. 
C.V. -=- Coefficient of variation during the decade 
Sandee Working Paper No. 2-03 7 
Particulars 
Ramanathapuram Tamil Nadu 
Net Net 
irrigated irrigated 























Mean 207177 28152 235809 847 911663 644272 2482433 928 
(87.86) (11.94) (100) (36.72) (25.96) (100) 
C.V. 6.84 17.96 5.87 17.38 7.23 8.08 2.80 14.66 
1970s 
Mean 192003 38987 231666 805 849276 918515 2695823 932 
(82.88) (16.83) (100) (31.50) (34.07) (100) 
C.V. 17.21 9.89 14.52 24.34 12.89 11.81 7.74 14.38 
1980s 
Mean 161966 48627 211800 826 607364 1037465 2486703 880 
(76.47) (22.96) (100) (24.42) (41.72) (100) 
C.V. 17.78 9.71 12.33 26.19 17.68 6.63 5.42 19.77 
1990s 
Mean 159852 52113 213364 894 621333 1313538 2775200 917 
(74.92) (24.42) (100) (22.39) (47.33) (100) 
C.V. 10.68 12.67 9.01 23.31 10.01 10.20 7.25 11.24 
As Table 1 shows, there is a sharp fall in tank-irrigated area coupled with a higher instability in tank 
irrigation during the 1970s and the 1980s both in Tamil Nadu and Ramanathapuram. However, there 
are sharp differences between Tamil Nadu and the district of Ramanathapuram when it comes to the 
changes in the area irrigated over years. While both the area irrigated by tanks and the total area 
irrigated declined in Ramanathapuram, the total area irrigated by all sources in Tamil Nadu increased 
in spite of the decline in area under tanks. This is due to the fact that the decline in area irrigated by 
tanks in Tamil Nadu has been more than offset by the increase in the area irrigated by wells in the state. 
However, the emergence of private wells in the district of Ramanathapuram could not catch up with the 
rest of Tamil Nadu, primarily because of the prevalence of saline aquifers in many parts of the district. 
The presence of a very loose soil structure that prevents the establishment of wells in several other 
parts of the district is another reason for the inadequate expansion of wells. The dwindling tank 
performance and concomitant decline in irrigated acreage in the district may have adverse impacts on 
the rural communities. Hence revival of tanks in the district may play a vital role in increasing rural 
income. 
Ramanathapuram is an agricultural district with about 830 mm of average annual rainfall, a net sown 
area of about 35 percent, and forests accounting for only four percent of the geographical area. Tanks 
account for more than 70 percent of the total area irrigated by all sources in the district while there is no 
land under canal irrigation. Rice is the major crop under tank irrigation in this district with an average 
yield of about 2500 kg/ha as compared to about 3500 kg/ha in Tamil Nadu. Even though the district has 
a very high density of tanks, the dependability of tanks is very poor. For example, an analysis of 45 
years of rainfall data for the district of Ramanathapuram shows that in a 10-year period, the tanks 
received a full supply of water for four years, an inadequate supply for two years, a very poor supply 
for two years, and an above-normal supply for another two years. 
Within the district of Ramanathapuram, the study focuses on two blocks, each representing two diverse 
agro-economic situations Paramakudi and Rajapalayam. The former represents a very poor region 
with the agricultural sector serving as the major source of livelihood while the latter represents a 
comparatively well-developed non-agricultural sector. From each of these two blocks, 15 tanks were 
selected for inclusion in a total of 30 tanks in the study. A household survey was then undertaken by 
selecting 10 farm households and five non-farm households associated with each tank. Two rounds of 
detailed interviews were undertaken. In the first round, information was collected on the general 
characteristics of the village community, village infrastructure, community efforts in tank management, 
institutional arrangements, income from tank usufructs, community coping mechanisms to overcome 
problems of poor water supply, and the presence and resolution of conflicts. In the second round of the 
survey, detailed household information on socio-economic factors, land ownership, agricultural practices, 
perceptions on the problems of tank degradation, private coping mechanisms, participation in tank 
management activities, etc., were collected2. 
The demographic profile of the two study sites (Paramakudi and Rajapalayam) shows that both the 
percentage of rural population and the share of agricultural workers to total workers are higher in the 
Paramakudi block than in the Rajapalayam block, which is relatively more industrialized. There are a 
number of cotton textile industries which serve as a major source of non-farm employment opportunity 
in Rajapalyam, whereas Paramakudi is industrially backward and hence the major coping mechanism 
for rural people during periods of drought is temporary or permanent migration. The duration of water 
2 The questionnaires used for collecting data at tank level and at household level are provided in Appendices 
1 and 2 respectively. 
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supply from tanks, the availability of supplemental sources of water, namely wells, and the extent of 
crop diversification and cropping intensity are the major factors affecting agricultural profitability in 
the study region. Tanks supply water normally for a period of 3-5 months immediately after the northeast 
monsoon season. A few large tanks supply water for two seasons thus facilitating two crops mainly 
rice in both seasons, or a long-duration crop like sugarcane or banana. In general, the cropping pattern 
in tank-irrigated areas is dominated by rice during the tank season, followed by crops such as vegetables, 
cotton or sugarcane depending on the availability of alternative sources of water and soil type. 
Rajapalayam, where there are more private wells, has a higher degree of crop diversity as well as 
cropping intensity. 
5. Degradation, poverty and collective action - An analytical framework 
This paper seeks to undertake three types of analyses. The first is a macro analysis of the determinants 
of tank degradation. In order to do this attention will be focused on degradation at the state and district 
levels and an econometric model developed to identify the determinants of degradation. The second 
part of the analysis focuses on the linkages between poverty, private coping mechanisms and collective 
action at the village and household levels. The last part of the analytical problem is to understand both 
the determinants of collective action and how collective action affects farm output. This section will 
discuss the analytical framework in detail. 
5.1. Macro analyses of tank degradation 
In order to study the linkages between tank degradation, cooperation and private action, a careful 
econometric analysis of tank degradation in the state of Tamil Nadu and the district of Ramanathapuram 
will be undertaken. In the econometric model, the dependent variable is defined as an index of tank 
degradationthe ratio of the gap between the potential area and actual area irrigated by tanks each 
year to the potential area that could be irrigated by the tanks. The potential irrigated area is calculated 
as the triennium average of area irrigated by tanks from 1960-61 to 1962-63.3 
It is hypothesized that, at the macro level, development of well irrigation was a critical factor that 
affected how communal tanks were viewed and used. The advent of green revolution crops made it a 
requirement to have assured water deliveries to match increased fertilizer usage. As a result, the 
government of India launched a major initiative to promote the use of wells. Government financing of 
rural electrification promoted an even more rapid diffusion of wells throughout Tamil Nadu. The rush 
to private wells was encouraged by the reality that tanks were becoming an unreliable source of irrigation. 
Even in years of very good monsoon rains, farmers were restricted to a single crop (rice) below most 
rain-fed tanks. In addition, increasing commercialization of the village economy with augmented 
agricultural income provided new investment funds for digging wells. Government policies such as 
cheaper credit for well-digging and a subsidized electric power supply for pumping have also encouraged 
the spread of private wells. Previous research has shown that the growth of private wells and the 
extensive development of water markets in tank commands have had a negative effect on the performance 
of tanks (Palanisami and Balasubramanian, 1999). In this model, the impact of growth of wells on tank 
3 The potential area that could be irrigated by tanks has been defined as the average area irrigated by tanks during the 
triennium 1960-61 to 62-63 since this is the starting triennium of our data set. Hence, as tank degradation proceeds over 
the years, it is logical to specify the actual area irrigated during the starting point of the data set as the potential area that 
could be irrigated by tanks. 
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degradation is captured by the number of additional wells (ADWELL) sunk in the preceding year in the state 
or the district. This is computed by taking the difference between the number of wells in year (t) and year (t-1). 
A quadratic term is also used for the additional wells (AWELLSQ) so as to identify whether there is a non- 
linear relationship between growth in wells and tank degradation. 
Another major problem threatening the survival of tanks is increasing encroachment into the tank 
water spread areas, supply channels, and catchments. The encroachments into supply channels and 
water spread areas, together with silt deposition in water spread areas, is a major upstream problem for 
most of the tanks. Removal of these encroachers involves substantial social, economic and political 
costs and hence very rarely is anything done to retrieve the tank areas lost to the encroachers. 
Encroachment into tank water spread areas is mainly due to the increase in population pressure and the 
lack of institutional mechanisms to prevent the encroachment. Absence of precise boundaries for tank 
water spread and catchments is another major facilitating factor responsible for large-scale 
encroachments. In the absence of reliable macro-level information on the extent of encroachment, 
population pressure is used as a proxy for encroachment, which is measured as the ratio of rural population 
to total population (RPTOTP). It is hypothesized that this variable will have a positive impact on tank 
degradation. 
Tank performance is of course critically dependent on rainfall. Rainfall (RAIN) affects tank performance 
in two ways: (1) directly through its effect on catchment runoff to tanks; and (2) indirectly through its 
effect on the performance of other sources of irrigation such as wells and canals. The consequent 
impact of the second on tanks is ambiguous. It is hypothesized that the direct effect of rainfall on tanks 
will be stronger and hence the effect of rainfall on tank performance will be positive. In spite of the 
declining role of community in managing tanks, there is one possible factor, viz., the profitability in 
rice production, that could revive or sustain the community's interest in tank management. Therefore, 
it is hypothesized that technical progress in rice production could have a positive impact on tank 
performance or that it could halt the process of tank degradation over a period of time. Hence, a one- 
year lagged rice yield (LRICEYD) is used as one of the independent variables so as to capture the 
impact of technical progress in rice cultivation on tank degradation and it is hypothesized that it will 
have a negative impact on the index of tank degradation. Finally, a trend variable (TREND) has been 
added to the regression equation to represent the left-out variables. 
The macro-econometric analysis was carried out for the state of Tamil Nadu as well as for the district of 
Ramanathapuram separately. The econometric model is specified as a multiple linear regression equation ofthe 
following form: 
TANKDEG = Bo 4- Bi ADWELL + B2 ADWELLSQ +133 RPTOTP +134 TREND (1) 
+135 LRICEYD + B6 RAIN 
Data to estimate this equation come from the Season and Crop Reports for Tamil Nadu published by 
the Government of Tamil Nadu for a period of 40 years from 1960 to 2000. 
4 Rice is the single most important crop in most of the tank-irrigated areas. Rice accounts for more than 90 percent of the 
tank-irrigated areas in the regular tank season cultivation. 
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Table 2. Definition of variables used, descriptive statistics and hypotheses 
5.2. Pover07, tank use and distribution of tank benefits 
A detailed descriptive analysis of the extent of dependence of poor and non-poor households "on 
tanks" has been carried out so as to have a broad understanding about the nexus between poverty, 
private property (access to land and private wells under the tank command), and the nature and extent 
of dependence on tanks for various agricultural and non-agricultural purposes of the households. The 
dependence on tanks have been quantified in terms of agricultural income from tank irrigated lands 
and the amount of non-agricultural revenue mobilized from tank usufructs such as trees, fishes, silt and 
crops raised on tank bunds. 
5.3. Micro-economic analysis of collective action for tank maintenance 
An important question that has been asked in this study is what are the determinants of collective 
action in tank management? Participation of households in tank maintenance activities is decided at 
village meetings. Of the 30 tanks studied, the collective effort towards maintenance of tanks was 
observed only in 18 tanks. In the remaining 12 tanks, no common maintenance activities were taken up 
during the survey years, viz., 1999-2000 and 2000-01. Even in these 18 tanks where there was some 
collective effort to maintain the tanks, the actual contribution was grossly inadequate for complete 
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22473.37 50167 1112 4029 Negative 
ADWELLSQ Square of 2955546335 6874390494 17041502 39500508 Positive 
ADWELL 




0.6705 3.736E-02 0.7173 2.38E-02 Positive 
TREND Time 20.50 11.11 20.50 11.11 Positive 
LRICEYD Lagged rice 
yield (kg/ha) 
2206.25 679.25 1256.57 501.04 Negative 
RAIN Annual 
rainfall (mm) 
909.26 134.31 830.17 183.58 Negative 
removal of silt and encroachment from tank water spread area and supply channels. There appears to 
be an overwhelming feeling among rural communities that tank maintenance is the state's duty since 
the state took over the responsibility of managing tanks decades back' . 
In all these 18 tanks where maintenance work was carried out, it was observed that the decisions 
regarding the nature and extent of tank maintenance activities are taken at village meetings. These 
decisions are mostly based on consensus among the farmers, provided there is sufficient participation 
of farmers at these meetings. Detailed discussions with the villagers revealed that participation in tank 
maintenance activities is not based on strategic interaction among the farmers but based on consensus 
regarding what has to be done and how much has to be spent on tanks. In some tanks where large 
numbers of private wells are found, voluntary participation by well-owners is relatively low. In the 
case of a few tanks, well-owners do not participate in collective action but take water from tanks. Non- 
well owners do not object to this because of their dependence on well-owners during periods of tank 
water scarcity. 
The independent variables for the analyses were selected after a careful review of the literature on 
factors affecting collective action. Firstly, group size is an important factor determining the extent of 
cooperation in the commons. Small groups are considered to be conducive for the emergence and 
stability of cooperative behaviour in view of lower heterogeneity and transaction costs associated with 
organizing group action (Wade, 1988). As data is not available on the exact number of farmers in each 
of the sample tanks, tank size (command area) is used as a proxy for group size (TKSIZE). Given the 
fact that the size of land owned under tanks does not show much variation across tanks, tank size 
provides a good proxy for group size. 
An important aspect of traditional irrigation institutions in tank areas (where the traditional institutions 
are still active) is the appointment of a common irrigator. The common irrigator is responsible for 
operating the sluice, irrigating the field, guarding the tanks against breaches due to floods and/or damages 
to the surplus weir of the tank by downstream farmers. They are sometimes responsible for protecting 
the crops raised during tank season against damage by cattle. These common irrigators, called neerkatti, 
are either appointed by the water users' associations, or are members of scheduled castes who have 
inherited the right to serve as neerkatti over generations. In tanks where the neerkatti system is prevalent, 
individual farmers are not allowed to operate the sluice or irrigate the field. Hence, the presence of the 
neerkatti is an important indicator of the effectiveness of the local institutional arrangement for tank 
management and for the enforcement of rules governing water distribution. Thus, we include a dummy 
variable (WATMAN) for institutional effectiveness that represents the presence or absence of neerkatti 
for irrigation water management under tanks. Education is another important factor that is likely to 
promote the participation of households in tank management work and hence the years of schooling 
(YSCHL) of the household head is used as one of the independent variables in our econometric model 
of collective action. 
Poverty is another important determinant of participation in collective action in the local commons 
since it is quite often suggested in the literature that household income has a negative effect on 
participation in the commons (Lise, 2000). Hence, we attempt to use farm size (F SIZE) as a proxy for 
5 This observation is based on the opinion survey we conducted during the course of the study, wherein we asked the 
villagers to rank the reasons for neglect of tanks. In more than 80 percent of the tanks studied, the reason tank maintenance 
is the state's duty was ranked first by the villagers. 
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income that will capture the effect of poverty on collective action in the commons6. Thus, we are using 
asset ownership as an indicator of poverty instead of income. While expecting a positive sign for farm 
size as it is likely to increase the dependence of the households on the tank and hence a higher level of 
participation by households with large farm size, we also use a quadratic term (FSIZESQ) for farm size 
as an additional regressor so as to identify whether there is a non-linear relationship between farm size 
and participation in collective action. 
The literature on common property resources is replete with analyses of the impact of income inequality 
among users as one factor affecting cooperation among village communities. A review of both theoretical 
and empirical work (Olson 1965, Baland and Platteau, 1997 and 1999, Dayton-Johnson and Bardhan, 
1998 and Bardhan, 2000) on the relationship between inequality and collective action reveals no definite 
clues about the direction of its impact. We use the Gini ratio for land owned under tank commands 
(GINI) as a measure of inequality in power and wealth as well as a quadratic term for the Gini ratio 
(GINISQ) in order to verify whether the inverted U-shaped relationship between wealth inequality and 
participation in collective action holds good in the context of tanks. 
People in tank irrigated villages have three types of private coping strategies, viz., private wells, and 
non-agricultural options such as migration and non-farm employment. All of these private coping 
strategies reduce the dependence on CPR tanks. The shift to non-farm employment and migration also 
reduces the labour availability at household level for CPR maintenance work. We attempt to capture 
the impact of these private coping strategies on the cooperative behaviour of the people using two 
variablesthe number of private wells owned (NWELLS) by the households and the share of non- 
farm income to the total household income (NFISHARE). It is hypothesized that both of these factors 
would negatively affect the extent of collective action for tank maintenance. 
The dependent variable is the total value of collective effort, which is calculated by summing up the 
monetary value of labour and money contributed for collective work. Since there was no contribution 
by many of the sample households, the dependent variable takes a zero value for all these observations. 
In view of the truncated nature of the dependent variable, the Tobit regression was used for this analysis. 
Thus, we model collective action in the following manner: 
COLLEFF = flo + RIWATMAN + RySCHL + a, FSIZE + 14 FSIZESQ + (2) 
B5NWELLS + B6 TKSIZE + II, GINI+ f18 GINISQ + 
R9NFISHARE 
This analysis is based on household data from all 300 farm households on the amount contributed by 
the household towards collective action and other related variables associated with households and 
tanks. The summary statistics of the independent variables used in the model are given in Table 3. 
6 There are two reasons for using farm size rather than income as an explanatory variable: First, it is not the current period 
income alone that decides the extent of participation in collective action. Secondly, even if we assume that use of current 
period income as an explanatory variable, the endogeneity problem arises because cun-ent period agricultural income is 
influenced by tank water availability which is partly due to the level of collective action. 
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Table 3. Summary statistics, definitions and hypotheses for the variables used 
Another way in which we try to estimate the importance of collective action is by identifying its 
impact on rice yield. Rice yield during the tank season (September to January) is the single most 
important yardstick by which tank performance can be quantified since rice is the most important 
crop cultivated during the tank season in all the tank commands of Tamil Nadu. Hence, the impact of 
collective effort on tank performance can be captured estimating a production function for rice 
during the tank season, with the extent of collective action as an independent variable among other 
important factors affecting rice yield such as fertilizer used, availability of alternative irrigation 
sources, labour, and expenditure on plant protection chemicals. The analysis is based on cross- 
section data from 212 farm households' spread over all the 30 tanks selected for the study. The 
estimated equation is: 
ln(RICEYD) = In 00 + 011n (FERTZR) + 021n( LABOUR )+ P 31n( NPCIDE )+ 
ln( SWIRRI )+ P5In(COLLEFF ) (3) 
' Out of the total number of 300 sample farms selected for the study, a rice crop was cultivated in only 212 farms. 
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Variable Description Mean 
Standard 
deviation Hypotheses 
WATMAN Dummy for common irrigator as 
a proxy for effectiveness of local 
institutional mechanism 
0.40 0.49 Positive 
YSCHL Education measured as years of 
schooling of household head 
4.34 5.79 Positive 
FSIZE Farm size in ha 2.09 10.23 Positive 
FSIZESQ Square of farm size 13.34 16.47 Negative 
NWELLS No. of wells owned per ha of 
land 
0.21 0.54 Negative 
TKSIZE Command area of the tank in ha 44.59 63.47 Negative 
GIN! Gini ratio of inequality in land 
operated under sample tanks 
0.71 1.67 Negative 
GINISQ Square of Gini ratio 0.51 2.36 Positive 
NFISHARE Share of non-farm income in the 
total household income 
0.41 0.74 Negative 
Table 4. Definition and summary statistics of the variables used in rice production 
function analysis 
6. Determinants of tank degradation 
An econometric analysis of degradation of tank irrigation at macro-level will shed light on the important 
factors affecting tank degradation. Further, since this analysis is based on time series data over a period 
of 40 years, it would greatly help in the understanding of the dynamics of tank degradation from a 
temporal perspective, which is a crucial feature of degradation of common property resources such as 
tanks. This analysis therefore aims to investigate the impact of factors such as the growth of private 
irrigation sources, especially wells, which is a major challenge to the survival of tanks, encroachments 
into catchment area, water spread area and supply channel, and technological progress in rice production 
and rainfall. The results of the econometric model for both the state of Tamil Nadu and the district of 
Ramanathapuram are presented in Table 5. 
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Variables Definition Mean Standard deviation 
RICEYD Rice yield (kg/ha) 2112 462.31 
FERTZR Value of fertilizers used (Rs./ha) 625 124.65 
LABOUR Value of human labour used 973 256.97 
(Rs . /ha) 
NPCIDE Number of pesticide spraying 2.7 1.98 
SWIRRI No. of supplemental well 
irrigation 
12.14 13.24 
COLLEFF Monetary value of collective 
effort (Rs./ ha) 
192.34 54.16 
Table 5. Determinants of degradation of tank irrigation in the state of Tamil Nadu and 
Ramanathapuram 
Adjusted 
R-squared 0.865 0.811 
F-value 41.618** 27.379** 
Note: * and ** indicate the statistical significance of the variable at five percent and one percent levels respectively. 
The adjusted R-square for both Tamil Nadu and Ramanathapuram reveal that the variables included in 
the regression analysis could explain more than 80 percent of the variation in the dependent variable 
tank degradation. The results for Tamil Nadu show that all the independent variables except lagged rice 
yield were found to be statistically significant with expected signs for the regression coefficients, while 
in Ramanathapuram all the variables except lagged rice yield and the ratio of rural population to total 
population were statistically significant. An interesting result is the U - shaped relationship between 
the number of wells and tank degradation both in the state of Tamil Nadu and the district of 
Ramanathapuram. This result has an interesting policy implication in that the number of private wells 
has a negative (positive) impact on tank degradation (tank performance) up to a certain threshold 
number of wells and then its impact on tank degradation (tank performance) turns positive (negative). 
Thus, the tanks and wells have a complementary relationship over a limited range (of number of wells) 
after which the relationship becomes competitive. This is possibly because the emergence of private 
wells in limited numbers contributes to agriculture by providing supplementary irrigation during tank 
water scarcity. 
The priority for the vast majority of villagers (the non-well owners) still appears to be the careful 
maintenance of tanks since these non-well owning farmers have to depend on tanks for irrigating their 
crops. Further, in view of their majority number, they may be able to solicit the active cooperation of 
the few well-owners for tank management. However, if the number of private wells exceed a certain 
threshold level, the investment in private sources of irrigation and the dependence on it will take 
precedence over the collective interest in maintaining the common pool tanks. When the number of 
private wells is sufficiently large, competitive groundwater markets emerge in the tank commands, 
which further contributes to reduced dependence on tanks for even non-well owners (since they will 
become water buyers). 
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Variables 
Tamil Nadu Ramanathapuram 
Coefficients Std. error t-value Coefficients Std. error t-value 
Constant -2.602 0.797 -3.263** -1.882 1.729 -1.088 
ADWELL -5.055 E-07 0.000 -1.892* -1.568 E-05 .000 -3.984** 
ADWLSQ 5.132E-12 0.000 2.810** 1.172E-09 .000 2.954** 
RPTOTP 4.051 1.059 3.827** 2.908 2.261 1.286 
TREND 2.367E-02 0.004 5.447** 1.358E-02 .005 2.828** 
LR10EYD 1.168E-05 0.000 0.341 1.758E-05 .000 .692 
RAIN -4.608E-04 0.000 -5.071** -4.050E-04 .000 -6.923** 
As expected, rainfall has the effect of reducing the pace of tank degradation in both the district of 
Ramanathapuram and the state of Tamil Nadu. Even though the ratio of rural population to total 
population was not significant in Ramanathapuram, it is found to be highly significant with a positive 
impact on tank degradation in Tamil Nadu. This implies that population pressure is one of the important 
factors hastening the process of tank degradation, perhaps through increased pressure on the resource, 
mainly in the form of encroachments into catchments and water spread areas' . Although the econometric 
analysis sheds light on several important aspects of the process of tank degradation, it does not provide 
any insights into the extent of dependence of different groups of village communities on tanks, their 
role/participation in tank maintenance, and the factors that impact on the participation. In the following 
sections, we present the results of a tabular analysis at the household and village levels in order to 
understand what is happening at the micro-level. 
7. Poverty, distribution of tank benefits and private coping strategies 
In this and subsequent sections, the paper discusses issues such as poverty, private coping strategies 
and dependence on tanks and their implications for collective action at the micro-level. The analyses 
are based on village and household level data associated with 30 tanks in two administrative blocks of 
the district of Ramanathapuram. To understand the nature and extent of dependence of poor and non- 
poor households on tanks, sample households are classified into two income categories, viz., households 
below poverty line (which are called poor households) and households above poverty line (called non- 
poor households). This difference helps in understanding their contribution to collective tank management 
work. This classification is based on the Government of India's norm for the poverty line, which is 
currently fixed at an annual per capita income of Rs. 18,000. 
7.1. Demographic particulars of sample households and their dependence on tanks 
The details on demographic aspects and the dependence of households on tanks are presented in Table 
6, which reveal that the non-poor households have smaller family size and comparatively higher levels 
of literacy than poor households. This is true for men and women. The worker-population ratio as well 
as the percentage of permanent migrants and family members engaged in non-agricultural activities is 
higher in poor households. 
$ Encroachment is a serious problem in many of the tanks. Our discussions with key informants and revenue authorities 
reveal that there are significant encroachments into the supply channel and water spread areas of tanks which reduce the 
quantum of water that reaches the tanks and also the storage capacity of tanks. This problem has already been documented 
by many of the studies on tanks quoted earlier. 
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Table 6. Demographic details of sample households 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations 
Table 7 shows the link between poverty and dependence on tanks. It is obvious from the table that the 
poor are much more dependent on tanks relative to the non-poor both for agricultural crop production 
and for non-crop activities such as livestock husbandry and fuel-wood collection. More than 90 percent 
of poor households depend solely on tanks for agricultural water while only two-thirds of the non-poor 
households depend solely on tanks for water. Further, over 85% of poor households are completely 
dependent on tank water for rearing livestock while only less than 25% of the non-poor said that they 
used only tank water for livestock needs. It is also interesting to note that approximately 50% of poor 
households are dependent on tanks to meet their fuel-wood and grazing needs. 
Table 7. Poverty and dependence on tanks 
Extent of dependence on tanks 
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Poor 0.48 0.23 92 49 87 
Non-poor 2.19 0.92 67 21 24 
Poor Non- poor 
6.38 (3.12) 5.15 (2.58) 
64.5 (48.12) 73.7 (55.13) 
27.5 (12.59) 41.2 (24.34) 
0.52 (0.12) 0.46 (0.59) 
22.35 (14.45) 11.37 (18.6) 
22.00 (13.5) 17.00 (24.5) 
Household 
Land owned (ha.) 
Particulars 





% of permanent migrants to total number 
of family members 
% of family members engaged in non- 
agricultural activities to total number of 
family members 
7.2. Revenue from tank usufructs and tank maintenance 
Tanks support not only crop production but a host of other related activities such as provision of 
water for drinking by humans and livestock, washing, bathing, etc. Tank water also facilitates 
provision of fodder to livestock, tree cultivation, fish culture and duck rearing. Moreover, tank silt is 
being used for brick making. However, though there is a vast potential for growing fish and trees in 
view of their non-consumptive use of tank water, the current levels of such use is low' . Data 
presented in Table 8 shows the importance of trees and fishery as sources of non-agricultural income 
from tanks. A further important finding is that poorer households obtain higher non-agricultural 
revenues relative to the less poor. This reinforces our earlier finding that the poor are much more 
dependent on tanks than the relatively better off households. Both poor and non-poor households 
spend a high proportion of the income generated from tanks on non-tank related activities such as 
renovation of temples or other common purposes. However, poorer households spend a relatively 
higher percentage of tank income on tank maintenance activities compared to the non-poor. Thus, 
poor people, whose dependence on tanks is higher, are also the major contributors to tank 
maintenance. 
9 Non-agricultural uses of tanks are beset with problems related to lack of clear rules and rights. When the state took over 
tank management, it also made significant intrusion into community rights over non-agricultural uses of tanks. Yet, it 
did not come out with a clear and uniform policy related to the sharing of non-agricultural revenues. This has led to a 
system of perverse incentives resulting in unauthorized use of tank usufructs by politically powerful groups and the use 
of the revenue from tank usufructs for purposes other than tank maintenance. In cases where income from tank 
usufructs accrues to the govemment, it is invariably added to the general financial accounts and not spent on tanks. The 
income from tank-bed tree plantations was generally shared among the local panchayats (under the jurisdiction of 
which the particular tank falls) and the State Govemment. However, neither of these organizations spends the revenue 
realized from trees exclusively on tanks. 
In spite of state intervention and the absence of well-defined property rights over tank usufructs, some village communities 
are successful in realizing non-agricultural revenues from tanks. The extent to which the village communities are 
successful in mobilizing revenues from non-agricultural uses of tanks is an important indicator of the effectiveness of 
tank management institutions. The rules for sharing income from tank fishery are even more complicated. 'Though, 
historically, the rights to fishery benefits were vested with the respective village panchayats, there are no systematic 
and / or uniform rules goveming the exploitation of fishery resources. In some places, fishery rights are held by 
individual farmers, while in some other tanks the panchayats or the State Government has the right to sell the fishery 
rights through auctioning. In view of the absence of uniform / systematic rules goveming tank fishery, unauthorized 
(open access) fishing is a common practice in many tanks 
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Table 8. Revenue obtained from tank usufructs and its utilization 
(Rs./ha of command area) 
Sources of revenue 
I. Revenue mobilized 
Fishery 
Trees 
Sale of silt 
Crops on tank bunds 
Total 175.00 (47.5) 99.40* (28.3) 
II. Utilization of revenue from tanks 
Added to village common 58.8 77 
funds 
Spent for tank maintenance 41.2 23 
Total 100 100 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. 
* denotes significant difference between poor and non-poor households. 
7.3. Private coping strategies 
Most of the tanks are solely dependent on catchment run-off during monsoon for water, which results 
in an uncertain and inadequate supply of water. This dependency on rainfall compels the farmers to 
devise community and individual coping mechanisms to circumvent the failure of crops due to water 
scarcity. Recurrent failure of tanks have led farmers in many of the dry regions to search for permanent 
solutions which mostly take the form of individual (private) solutions such as construction of private 
wells within the tank command, non-farm employment, permanent migration, etc. These exit options 
have significant impact on the opportunity costs of conservation efforts. Further, migration is always a 
threat that may change the economic viability of a conservation regime due to loss of those who contribute 
needed resources (Ostrom, 2000). Given the expansion in non-agricultural employment opportunities 
and migration, the neglect of tanks has to be viewed in the broader context of their declining role in 
agriculture in many areas, especially in areas where there are alternative income-earning opportunities. 
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Poor Non- poor 
69.50 (59.41) 38.30* (16.42) 
91.00 (62.65) 57.00* (55.74) 
14.50 (18.45) 4.10* (15.61) 
Table 9. Private coping mechanisms by the sample households 
Percentage of farm households with non- 
farm employment 
Percentage of farm households with 
permanent migrants 
Percentage of farms with own wells 







Note: i) Figures in parentheses are standards deviations 
ii) The percentages do not add to 100 since most of the coping strategies are not mutually exclusive 
The extent to which various coping mechanisms are adopted by the village community to manage the 
poor performance of tanks depends on the extent of land holding, the human capital availability of the 
households, access to groundwater, and other socio-economic conditions of the family. As Table 9 
shows, both poor and non-poor households adopt various strategies to cope with the failure of agriculture 
and inadequate water. Fewer poor households own private wells (20% compared to over 55% for the 
non-poor) because of the small size of their land holdings and inadequate capital for digging wells. The 
groundwater market purchase of well water from neighbouring farmers who own wells in tank 
command areas is a major coping strategy among poorer households. Migration is another important 
strategy. The non-poor appear to be coping with water and agricultural problems by finding off-farm 
employment. 
7.4. Private wells in tank command and market for water 
Private wells are emerging as a major supplementary source of irrigation in many of the tank irrigated 
areas. Emergence of wells is influenced by many factors such as the advent of green revolution 
technology, which created the need for assured irrigation, commercialization of the village economy, 
the transition from subsistence to market-based agriculture, and the increasing uncertainty and instability 
in water availability from common pool irrigation tanks. The perverse incentives created by state policies 
such as provision of electricity for agriculture at full subsidy served as a major external impetus for the 
emergence of wells. These wells are mainly recharged through the seepage flow from tanks and hence 
there is a close hydrological linkage between tanks and wells. The hydro-economic interaction between 
the performance of tanks and the number of wells per unit of tank command area is a complex issue. 
However, a closer look at the role of private wells in common pool tank command areas reveals that the 
wells play a negative role vis-a-vis tank performance and the sustainability of tanks in the long run. 
The impact of private wells on tanks has two kinds of impacts: 
In any given year, the wells complement tank performance through reducing the uncertainties in 
tank water supply; 
In the long -run, however, wells negatively affect, or act as a potential challenge to, tank performance 
through reduced dependence of well-owners on tanks and their vested interest in increasing their income 
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S.No. 
Particulars 
Poor Non- poor 
through sale of well water. Quite often the well-owners act as local monopolists in view ofthe strategic location 
oftheir wells in relation to lands belonging to non-well ovvners. 
The data on private wells and the extent of dependence on tank vs. well water for crop production 
presented in Table 10 reveal that the number of wells per ha of land area was 0.32 for non-poor 
households, while it was only 0.11 for poor households. Consequently, dependence on others both in 
terms of the number of households purchasing well-water and the average number of irrigations done 
using purchased well-water was higher for the category of poor households . 
Table 10. Details of private wells in tank command and the extent of dependence on 
community tanks 
Note: Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. 
7.5 Sources of Income 
The data provided in Table 11 show the income from agricultural and non-agricultural activities of 
sample households. The income from various sources for poor and non-poor households show significant 
differences both in terms of the income received and the share of different income sources in total 
income. The non-poor households received more income from both agriculture and non-agricultural 
activities as compared to the poor households. The poor households received more remittance income 
from migrants. However, the share of total agricultural income as well as that of tank-based agricultural 
income in the total income of households is higher for poor households than for non-poor households. 
Thus, Table 9 reinforces our general conclusion that poor households depend more on income from 
activities supported by common property resources relative to the less poor. Thus, the livelihood security 
of the poor greatly depends on the success or failure of CPRs. 
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Particulars Poor Non- poor 
No. of private wells per ha of land owned 0.11 (0.54) 0.32 (1.20) 
Total no. of irrigation done for tank season rice 
crop using 
a) Tank water 28.6 (34.89) 30.81 (29.63) 
b) Own well-water 3.62 (26.14) 13.36 (8.08) 
c) Well-water purchased from others 9.57 (12.33) 3.70 (7.37) 
Percentage of private water sellers to total 
number of farmers 
14.21 (22.50) 43.20 (26.8) 
Table 11. Source-wise income of sample households' (income in Rs./year) 
Note: * and ** indicate that that the values are significantly different between the two groups of households at 5% and 1 % levels respectively. 
Figures in parentheses are standard deviations. 
8. The role of village communities in tank conservation and management 
Though the tanks in Tamil Nadu have been taken over by the government, the village communities still 
play a crucial role in the maintenance of tanks. Farmers contribute both physical labour and money for 
various tank management work. The modus operandi of mobilizing the required labour/money generally 
take the form of an informal meeting of farmers (not all the villagers) at the beginning of the season in 
order to decide what kind of maintenance work should be taken up and how to mobilize funds/labour. 
In most cases, the exact contributions are decided on the basis of the nature and urgency of the work to 
be taken up and the physical condition of different tank structures. Activities of significance that are 
taken up very frequently and recurrently are the cleaning up of supply channels and diverting water 
from the upstream, and minor repairs to sluices, surplus weirs and tank bunds. Labour-intensive activities 
such as cleaning supply channels are done by the farmers themselves, the labour of which is equally 
shared among all farmers irrespective of the extent of land owned under the tank command. Minor 
activities such as repairs to sluices, surplus weirs and bunds, which do not require labour from all 
farmers, are done by hired labour and the expenditure towards such works is met from the funds 
'° Household income from various sources have been quantified by collecting detailed information on crop production 
aspects, income from livestock husbandry, non-farm employment, non-farm business, and remittances received from 
migrants. Detailed interviews were conducted with the household head as well as the other household members who are 
actually engaged in farm and non-farm activities to elicit reliable information on income from various occupations. 
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S. No Particulars Poor Non-poor 
1 Income from crops raised in tank command 13050 (1857) 18487* (2554) 
2 Income from crops outside tank command 2178 (1345) 4930** (1886) 
3 Income from subsidiary farm enterprises 7586 (3481) 9855 (2562) 
4 Income from water sale 146 (123) 984* (561) 
5 Total income from agriculture 22960 (1346) 34256* (7892) 
6 Remittance income from permanent migrants 5017 (691) 3885* (1238) 
7 Income from seasonal migration 4650 (789) 2956* (1103) 
8 Income from white and blue collar jobs 8605 (1945) 35980** (11497) 
9 Income from non-farm business 4348 (987) 17056** (9231) 
10 Total non-farm income 22620 (4779) 59877* (6798) 
11 Total household income from all sources 45580 (5489) 94133** (18791) 
12 Per capita income from all sources 7144 (912) 18278** (2598) 
13 % of agricultural income to total household income 50.37 (38.23) 36.39* (23.48) 
14 % of tank-based agricultural income to total 
household income 
28.63 (22.12) 19.64* (14.78) 
mobilized for the purpose. The amount of money mobilized for such special work is typically based on the 
extent of land owned by the individual farmers in the tank command (which is called "acre-levy" since it is 
based on the acres of land owned under the tank command). Labour and capital-intensive activities such as 
removal of encroachtnents and silt in tank water spread areas are very rarely done. 
8.1.Extent of participation in collective action 
The data on collective contributions to tank maintenance and management by the two income categories 
presented in Table 12 indicate that supply channel maintenance is an important activity to which both categories 
of households contribute. The extent of participation in tank management is significantly higher among poor 
households as compared to non-poor households. Labour was the major form of contribution to the collective 
effort towards tank maintenance. The total amount of labour expended by poorer households was almost 100 
percent more than that by the non-poor households. The field channels serving individual parcels of land 
belonging to different farmers have to be maintained by the respective farmers. Households were requested to 
report time spent on this activity too as a component of the extent of participation since the researchers were 
concerned with all activities related to tank maintenance. 
Table 12. Extent of participation of households in tank maintenance work 
(Average for the years 1999-2000 and 2000-01) 
Note: i) Figures in parentheses are standard deviations 
o * denotes significant difference between poor and non-poor households. 
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Collective contribution for tank 
Poor Non-poor 
maintenance 
I. Labour spent on (in man-days / ha of 
command area) 
Supply channel maintenance 4.72 (6.16) 2.48* (8.27) 
Diversion of water for the tank 0.61 (1.20) 0.17 (4.3) 
Field channel maintenance 1.82 (0.68) 0.94 (1.34) 
Total labour spent 7.15 (2.68) 3.59 (2.71)* 
Total value of labour spent on all the 228.8 (23.71) 125.65 (37.15)* 
activities (Rs./ha of command area) 
II. Cash contributed for tank maintenance 18.45 (21.66) 11.70 (19.42) 
(Rs./ha of command area) 
III. Total monetary value of contribution for 247.26 137.34 
tank maintenance (Rs./ha of command area) 
8.2. Determinants of collective action for tank maintenance 
The results of the Tobit regression analysis for identifying the factors affecting collective action are 
presented in Table 13. The results are, in general, consistent with the economic theory and empirical 
literature on the factors affecting collective action in local commons. The regression coefficients indicate 
that one of the important local private coping mechanisms, viz., the number of private wells owned by 
a household in tank command area, was found to be statistically significant in negatively affecting the 
extent of collective action for tank maintenance. This result provides stronger evidence to the argument 
that private coping strategies operate against community interests when it comes to sustaining collective 
action for tank management. Since wells in tank commands are used to privatize common pool tank 
water because of the physical interdependence between tank storage and well-water recharge, those 
who have private wells are less motivated to participate in tank maintenance (Sakurai and Palanisami, 
2001). However, poor people who cannot afford to invest in wells and hence are directly and solely 
dependent on tank water contribute more for tank maintenance. Therefore, the tank management policy 
should aim at promoting community wells for poor people. Another avenue for safe-guarding the poor 
is to promote policies that encourage diversification of cropping patterns away from rice. Crop 
diversification may increase incomes and reduce the demand for water, which may enable poor farmers 
to purchase water from the emerging competitive water markets. 
Table 13. Factors affecting collective action in tank maintenance 
Note: * and ** indicate the statistical significance of the variable at five percent and one percent levels respectively. 
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Variable Coefficient Standard error 
Constant 25513.15 4110.64 
WATMAN 912.74** 100.83 
YSCHL -3.49 12.59 
FSIZE 141.07** 56.71 
FSIZESQ -13.63* 6.90 
WELLDEN -598.54* 277.77 
TKSIZE -0.8616** 0.28 
GINI -77021.83** 12032.97 
GINISQ 56442.76** 8682.14 
NFI SHARE -0.3798 1.29 
Log likelihood function -896.84 _ 
Sigma 470.85 35.23 
Sample size 300 
The regression coefficients for inequality in land ownership (GINI and GINISQ) reveal that there is a 
U-shaped relationship between inequality in land ownership and the extent of cooperation, which is in 
conformity with the results obtained by Bardhan (2000). The tank size, which is a proxy for group size, 
has negative influence on the extent of collective action probably due to the fact that the larger tanks 
involve a higher number of beneficiaries. In many cases these tanks serve more than one village thus 
increasing heterogeneity that discourage cooperative action among farmers. The presence of a common 
irrigator, which represents vestiges of traditional institutional mechanisms (or prior institutional 
experience), is found to play a strong positive role in sustaining cooperation among tank farmers. 
Hence, the presence or otherwise of common irrigators in tanks signals cooperation among village 
communities in managing the tanks. The share of non-farm income to total income and the educational 
status of the households do not affect the extent of collective action significantly. These two results- 
the negative impact of group size and the positive impact of prior institutional experience on collective 
action are the complete opposite of results obtained by Heltberg (2001) in the context of forest 
conservation in Rajasthan, India. However, our results are in congruence with the theoretical literature 
on the relationship between group size, prior institutional experience and the extent of collective action. 
8.3. Economic impact of collective action 
The collective efforts when it comes to tank maintenance are aimed at improving the performance of 
tanks. Hence it is important to investigate the impact of collective action on the performance of tanks. 
The yield of crops cultivated during a tank season could serve as an important indicator of tank 
performance. Therefore, the production function analysis was carried out for the tank-season rice crop 
by explicitly incorporating the extent of collective effort as an explanatory variable. The results are 
presented in Table 14. 
Table 14. Impact of collective action on rice yield 
Note: ** and * indicate the levels of significance at one percent and five percent levels respectively. 
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Variable Output elasticity Std. Error t 
Constant 5.353 .472 11.337 
FERTZR 0.161* .072 2.231 
LABOUR -4.348E-02 .061 -.710 
NPCIDE 5.600E-02 .036 1.557 
SWIRRI 0.298** .062 4.771 
COLLEFF 0.486** .130 3.744 
Adj. R-squared 0.5126 
F-value 38.71 (N=212) 
The production function analysis reveals that the number of supplemental irrigation from private 
wells and fertilizer inputs have a statistically significant positive impact on rice productivity. The 
extent of collective efforts when it comes to tank maintenance also had a similar impact thus implying the 
importance of tank management institutions in sustaining rice productivity. The significance of both the number 
of supplemental well irrigation and the extent of collective action in increasing rice productivity has important 
policy implications for tank management and the regulation ofprivate wells in tank commands. Even though the 
increase in number of wells is a threat to the collective effort at macro level, supplemental well irrigation is a 
crucial determinant of rice yield at farm level. This is due the fact that tank water becomes very scarce during 
the end of the season while the water applied during the last few weeks of the rice season is a critical factor 
determining rice yield. 
9. Conclusions and policy implications 
The central concern of the present study has been to explore the nexus among poverty, private coping 
mechanisms and collective action towards tank management and its implications for agricultural 
productivity and sustainability of tanks. Besides contributing to policy, our study tests several important 
theoretical hypothesesthe relationship between poverty, inequality, group size and exit options on 
the one hand and community participation in collective action on the other. The results of our study 
broadly agree with theoretical expectations as well as most previous empirical works on the issue the 
world over. 
The dependence of poor people on tanks is found to be an important driving force behind their active 
participation in tank maintenance. More than 80 percent of the poor households depend on tanks for 
crop and livestock husbandry while approximately 50 percent of these households depend on tanks for 
grazing and fuel-wood. Consequently, not only do these poor households generate significant amounts 
of revenue from various tank usufructs such as fishery and trees but also spend significant portions of 
this income on tank maintenance. Poorer households also spend 100 percent more labour than their 
non-poor counterparts on tank maintenance activities. 
The macro-level econometric analysis of tank degradation in both the state of Tamil Nadu and 
in the district of Ramanathapuram provide strong evidence that there has been a secular decline in the performance 
of tanks. This decline is most likely due to the decline of the local institutional set-up responsible for tank 
maintenance as well as changes in the overall socio-economic environment in which the tanks are managed. 
More importantly, the U-shaped relationship between the number of private wells and tank degradation has 
important policy implications. Given the hydrological dependence of wells on tanks as a major recharge 
mechanism" , it could be argued that the wells are, partly, a mechanism to 'privatize' common pool tank water. 
However, given the heavy investtnent, the poor are unable to go for this private option. This points to the need 
for institutional intervention in order to regulate well-irrigation in tank commands so as to sustain collective 
action towards tank management. The existing government-enforced norms for regulating the digging of new 
wells, such as the minimum distance between two wells and the licensing of well digging, have to be strictly 
" A detailed discussion with the farmers in the tank commands indicate that the wells are highly dependent on tanks for 
recharging. The water table in most wells goes down dramatically within a few weeks after the tanks go dry. 
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enforced in tank commands taking into consideration the local conditions and their implications for sustaining 
cooperation among tank usersu . 
The above policy suggestion is further reinforced by the micro-level econometric model of collective action, 
which indicates that the increase in the number of private wells has a negative impact on collective action for 
tank management. However, even though the wells pose a threat to collective action in conserving tanks, farm- 
level production function analysis for rice indicates that supplemental well inigation has a strong positive influence 
on rice yield. Hence, farmers have a strong private interest in digging wells, which is in conflict with their 
collective interestthe sustainability of tanks. The importance of both collective action and private wells in 
increasing agricultural productivity and the negative relationship between collective action and private wells 
throw upan important policy issue the question ofthe optimal number of wells and an institutional mechanism 
to regulate the number of wells. 
Diversification of cropping patterns away from the water-intensive rice crop is another strategy that 
will reduce the dependence on wells. Government and/or NGO support for community wells would 
also mitigate the negative impacts of private wells on collective action. Promoting community wells 
instead of private wells is a win-win strategy in the sense that any cooperative effort to manage tanks 
will complement the cooperative effort needed to provide and operate community wells (and vice- 
versa), which would in turn reduce the dependence on private property water resources. Given that the 
community- managed wells also provide positive externalities, provision of government or other 
assistance for digging community wells can be justified on efficiency grounds. 
Collective action by the poor and its importance for sustaining livelihoods should receive due policy 
attention so as to ensure that those who contribute labor and other resources for tank management 
should be vested with the right to enjoy the non-agricultural benefits of tanks. This helps sustain poor 
people's livelihoods as well as their interest in tank management. To ensure this, it is necessary to 
develop a suitable property rights structure over the various economic attributes of tanks that will 
benefit a wider spectrum of rural communities by broadening the stakeholder base of the tanks. 
The other important lesson that can be elicited from the study is that the persistence of traditional 
governance structures (for instance, the presence of common irrigators for enforcing and monitoring 
water allocation rules) seems to promote collective action. This has an important policy implication. 
Strengthening the governance structure (say by common irrigators) in areas where the system is in 
operation and introducing the system in areas where it is absent will enhance collective action. Turning 
over tank management to village communities, together with the rights over tank usufructs and the 
authority to prevent and remove encroachments, is an important step towards strengthening the 
governance structure that will promote a sustainable tank management regime. Finally, there is a lot of 
scope for linking the on-going government programmes, such as the watershed and wasteland 
development programmes, with tank rehabilitation work, so as to promote an integrated water harvest 
and management regime for the overall development of the tank-irrigated areas. 
12 The state government has recently introduced a Groundwater Law, which stipulates that all farmers in the state should get 
prior permission from the government for digging new wells or deepening old wells. There is also a norm called the "well- 
spacing norm" stipulated by the National Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development according to which a minimum 
distance of 200 metres between the wells has to be maintained so as to avail oneself of institutional credit for digging wells. 
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APPENDIX 1 
Analysis of Interrelationship between Poverty, Private Property and Common Property 
Natural Resource Management in South India 
(Research Project funded by the South Asian Network for Development and Environmental 
Economics, Nepal) 
Principal investigator: R.Balasubramanian, Associate Professor 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
Tamil Nadu Agricultural University 
Coimbatore 641 003 
Questionnaire for tank level survey 
1. Name of the tank: 
2. Block: District: 
3. Village and Beneficiaries: 
4. Demographic details: 
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S. 
No 
Name of the villages Total 
ayacut 
area 















Villages Total population Number of 
households 





5. A) Caste composition: 
5. B) Non-agricultural employment 
5. C) Migration 
Sandee Working Paper No. 2-03 33 
Caste Number of 
households 
Approximate % of land owned by these 













No. of days 
engaged 
I) Throughout the year 
II) If seasonal, how many (approximate) no. of 
days engaged: 
a) During normal year 
b) During current year (Drought year) 




No. of fatuities in 
which one or more 
members have 
migrated 








6. Indicators of prosperity levels and village infrastructure 
i.. No. of houses with RCC ceilings 
ii. No. of tiled houses 
iii. No. of thatched houses 





Motor cycles / scooters 
0 Mopeds 
Power sprayers 
Household telephone connections 
Grinders or Mixers 
L.p.gas connection 
Bio-gas plant 
1) Household television sets 
No. of households with cable connection 
No. of children studying in English medium school 
v. Village infrastructure 
No. of petty shops (within the village) 
No. of tea stalls (within the village) 
Distance to nearest town 
Distance to the nearest bus stop 
No. of bus trips per day 
0 Distance to primary health center 
Distance to commercial bank 
Distance to Cooperative trade society 
Distance to agricultural input depot 
Distance to cooperative milk society 
Distance to post office 
1) Distance to village office 
m) Distance to 
Primary school: 
Middle school /high school: 
Higher secondary school: 
College: 
7. Cropping Pattern in a normal Year 
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Name of the 
village 
Season - I Season - II Season - III 
Crop Area Crop Area Crop Area 
8. Land transfers and tenancy 
Were there any significant land transfers (buying and selling of land) in the village: Yes \ No 
If yes, in which year did significant transfers take place? 
What were the reasons? 
Approximate extent of tenant cultivation in the tank command area : 
Average rent paid for leased-in land (Rs/acre) 
0 Mode of payment of rent : Kind \ cash 
9. Details of wells in the tank command area 
No. of wells in the tank command area : Head reach : Tail reach : 
Depth of wells (in feet) : Min. Max. 
Normal year Drought Year 
Duration of water supply available 
from wells for irrigation (in months) 
Approximate area irrigated per well 
Area under different crops cultivated 
with well-water during non-tank season 
(for the tank common as a whole) 
0 Extent of sales /purchase of well 
water during tank-water scarcity 
No. of buyers 
No. of sellers 
Price of well-water 
10. Community well 
No. of community wells 
Year of digging 
Dug by : Govt. / P.0 / Farmers / NGO assisted 
Describe its usefulness in terms of 
No. of users 
Extent of usage in normal year : 
Extent of usage in dry year 
Extent of usage during the 
beginning and end of the season 
a) What are the operational rules regarding: 
Timing of usage 
- Pump set operated by 
- Decision-making on the 
- Operation and the management 
- How the costs are shared? 
How the accounts are maintained? 
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11. Are the farmers knowledgeable about tanks in chain? Yes / No 
12. If yes, how many tanks are there in the chain? 
13. How many in the upstream? 
14. How many in the downstream? 
15. Number of tank flooding in the past 10 years. 
16. What are the perceived non-agricultural roles of tanks in the village economy? Ask the villagers to rank 
the various uses of tank on a scale of 1 to 10. 
17. Property rights regime over the various tank usufructs 
Who has the authority over management of different tank usufructs? 
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Role Priority ranks 
1. Drinking water-Direct use 
2.Drinking water-indirect use (Recharging wells) 
3 .0ther domestic uses (Bathing, washing) 
4. Sale of silt 
5.Ground water recharge 
6. Forestry 
7.Grazing ground for livestock during off-season 
8. Source of water for livestock 
9. Fish culture 
10. Duck rearing 






1. Social forestry 
2. Duck rearing 
3. Fishing 
4. Silt collection 
5. Livestock grazing 
6. Livestock drinking 
7. Washing and bathing 
8. Drinking 
18. Perception of problem of deterioration 
Do the farmers think that the tanks have degraded over years? Yes / No 
If yes, how do they perceive the decline / degradation? Rank the reasons on a 10-point 
scale) 
19.What are the reasons for lack of maintenance/revival effort? Rank the reasons on 10-point scale. 
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Reasons Ranks 
1. Reduction in water received by the tank 
2. Siltation in the waterspread area 
3. Reduction in area irrigated 
4. Catchment degradation 
5. Poor condition of supply channels 
6. Increase in encroachment in waterspread area 
7. Increase in encroachment in supply channel 
8. Increase in number of private wells in the tank 
command 
9. Weak bunds and sluice 
10. Poor distribution network 
Factors Rank 
1.Restoration of tank is State's duty 
2.Catchments degradation and encroachment are multivillage problem, so 
villagers cannot take action to remove the encroachments 
3.Caste conflict in the village - hence no cooperation 
4. Non-cooperation from well-owners 
5. Poverty / financial constraints 
6. Declining role of agriculture in village economy and hence 
villagers are not interested in maintaining the tank 
7. The tank is a multi-village tank. So, co-operation is difficult 
8. Non-agricultural use of tank is meager 
9. Income from tank usufructs is not sufficient to take up repair 
work by the village community. 
10. The villagers do not have the authority to take up repairs and 
the PU/PWD is not taking up repairs. 
20. Maintenance (Give details of improvements/repairs done in the last five years). 
21. Improvements made to tank structures in the last 10 years (by the farmers) 
Who carried out the actual work? Farmers / Hired Labour / both 
If work-wise break-up is not available give the total amount spent on (a) thru' (g) 
22. Present condition of different tank structures 
23. Impact of improvements 
Extent of increase in storage capacity 
Extent of increase in cropped area 
Increased income due to increase in 
cropped area \ water availability 
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: Good \ Eroded\ Encroached \ Barren 
: Good \ Encroached \ Silted 
: Strong no breaches 
Weak Breaches 
: Silted slightly \ moderately \ heavily 
Encroached slightly \ moderately \ heavily 
: Good \ moderate \ Poor condition 
: Good \ moderate \ Poor condition 
: Good \ moderate \ Poor condition 






















Desilting and repairing supply 
channels 
Desilting waterspread area 
Eviction of encroachment 
Strengthening the bund 
Repairing the sluice 







0 Distribution network 
g) Surplus weir 
d) Increase in revenue generated through other means . Give details. 
Fish culture 
Tree cultivation 
Herbal \ Vegetable cultivation on tank bund 
Others (Specify) 
24. Water users' association (WUA) 
Whether water users' association is present? Yes \ No 
If yes, mention whether the WUA is : Formal/informal 
Active/inactive 
Traditional /newly formed 
If there is no WUA, why? 
What is the structure of the WUA? Who is empowered to formulate and implement rules and 
regulations for water use and management decisions? 
What are the functions or role of organization? 
What are the roles of various social and economic groups in the WUA? 
1 .Role of social groups (caste based) 
2.Role of economic groups (rich or poor) 
h. What are the problems faced by WUA? 
What is your assessment regarding the performance of WUA / farmers' cooperation in tank 
management? 
Were there any changes in rules governing tank management in the last 10 years with respect to the 
following? If so, explain briefly the reasons and the impact of new rules. 
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Role Assessment Reasons for 





















Bringing / diverting water to tank 
Catchment management 
Supply channel maintenance 
Removal of encroachment 
Water management 
Sluice operation 
Maintenance of field channels 







Deciding crop choice 
Lobbying with PWD / PU 
25. Revenue mobilization: (Rupees/year) (Last 3 years) 
How is fish culture practiced in the tank? 
Who lets fingerlings in the tanks? 
Naturally grown \ FFDA \ Farmers \ All villagers 
Who harvests the fishes? 
FFDA \ Tank farmers \ All villagers\ Allowed free catch by other farmers 
26. Management of village common fund and its utilization. 
a. Sources of revenue for village common fund other than tank usufructs. 
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Impact of changes 
(Positive / negative) 
i. Cleaning supply channel 
ii. Removal of encroachment 
iii. Desilting 
iv. Sluice operation 
v. Cleaning distribution network 
vi. Water distribution 
vii. Fish culture 
viii. Harvesting trees 
ix. Sharing fishes 
x. Sharing income from tank 
usufructs 
Year Farmers' levy / Fishing Duck Social Tree crops Sale of silt Crops Grazing on 
subscription to 
WUA 






Do all the households contribute to the household levy? Yes \ No 
Who does not? Why? 
How are the funds maintained? 
Deposited in bank / By the village committee 
Are the funds mobilized from tank usufructs maintained as a separate account or added to 
village common funds? 
What are the actual uses for which the village common funds were utilized in .the last 5 years? 
27. Water control and management: 
Is there any restriction for particular use / users in the tank? Give reasons? 
Who irrigates the field? 
Neerkatti / Farmers 
When is the tank water made available for irrigation? 
As soon as tank gets adequate water/Only at the time of preparatory tillage 
If sluices are opened only at the time oftransplanting / preparatory tillage, how do the non-well owners raise 
nursery? Give number of farmers under each practice 
Purchase well water / Purchase seedlings / 
Other means for nursery raising / (specify) 
How many farmers raise nursery before tank gets water? Give number of farmers. 
All well-owners /Not all well-owners / Well-owners + some non-well owners as well 
Who appoints neerkatti / neer paichchi (common irrigator) ? 
Water Users' Association appoints him every year / Neerkatti belongs to a particular family which inherits 
the right over generations 
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Source of Revenue Amount mobilized 
Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year4 Year 5 
1.Sale of trees in village 
common lands 
2. Household levy 
3. Others (Specify) 
Purpose Amount utilized 
Year 1 Year2 Year3 Year4 
Temple renovation 
Tillage festivals 
Lobbying for village 
infrastructure 
Others (specify) 
Payment for ' neerkatti' : 
* Mode of payment 
* Quantity 
* Frequency of payment 
Is there any water kept in the tank as reserve? Yes/No 
If yes, when and how much of water (%) is kept as reserve? 
Who decides it? 
For what purpose is it used? 




Drinking water! washing 
I. What rights do the landless people have regarding the use of tanIc water? 
28. Coping mechanism 
A. Individual Coping Mechanism 
How do farmers cope with decline in tank performance / during drought years? 
B. Is there any other CPR / open access resource in the village on which poor people depend during dry 
seasons / drought years? Give details on extent of such CPRs such as common or open access forests 
Area under trees 
Area under grazing 
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Coping mechanism Number / percentage of farmers 
1. Own well water 
2. Purchase of well water 
3. Non agricultural employment 
4. Seasonal migration 
5. Charcoal making 
6. Wage labour in agriculture 
8. Reduction in cropped area 
9. Crop pattern changes 
10. Remittance income 
11. Others (specify) 
C. Community Coping Mechanism 
D. Collect detailed information on the following aspects: 
How and who devises the community coping mechanisms? 
What is the penalty for non-participation/non-compliance with the coping mechanisms? 
29. Conflicts: 
a. Are there any conflicts among the water users? Yes ¡No 
b. If yes, 
When? 
Between Whom? 
What are the reasons for conflict? 
c. How are these settled? 
d. If the tank is a multi-village tank is there any inter-village conflicts in sharing water? 
Yes \ No 
e. If yes, when and for what reasons does it arise and how was it solved? 
f. Are there any unresolved conflicts, which severely disrupted water sharing \ distribution 
among users? 
g. If yes, give reasons. 
30. Details on crop production 
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Coping mechanism Extent of participation / compliance 
Well-owners Non-well owners 
1. Cleaning supply channels / distribution 
channels 
2. Sluice rotation 
3. Lobbying with upstream tanks for water 
4. Imposing proportional limitation in conunand 
area to be cultivated 
5. Imposing crop restriction 
6. Lobbying with PWD/PU to repair tank 
structure 
7. Pumping from tank 
8. Others (Specify) 
b. Approximate area cultivated with tank water in the last 3 years. 
2000-01 1999-2000 1998-1999 
Tank season (Sep-March) 
Non-tank season (Apr-August) 
C. Market infrastructure 
1. Distance to nearest market 
For inputs 
For outputs 





3. Any new crops introduced in the last 10 years? Give reasons 
4. Sale of crop output 
Local (itinerary) merchants : % of total crop output 
Sold in nearest market : % of total crop output 
31. Party politics in the village 
Political activities ofthe villages 
Very active \ Moderate \ Inactive 
Patronage enjoyed by the village from politicians 
MLAs \ MPs \ Minister \ Others 
Political affiliation of the villagers 
Caste-based affiliation 
No strong relationship between caste and political patronage 
32. Power structure in the village 
Is there a system of village leadership such as 
Naattamaildcarar \ Ambalakkar \ Village Headman 
If so, to which caste does he belong? 
How is he appointed? 
Is there any ward member \ panchayat president \ district panchayat member from this 
village? 
If so, to which caste he belongs? 
How do the dalits participate in the village life ? 
Village festivals 
Temple maintenance 
Do the dalits have a stake in village common funds? If yes describe. If no , give reasons 
What is the major occupation of Dalits? 
Agri. Labour \ Non-agri labour \ others 
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If Dalits own lands in the village, 
Dryland \ wetland (tank command) 
If dalits (scheduled caste people) own land in tank commands where , 
Head \ middle \ tail reach 
Do the dalits get a share in fishes grown in tank ? How much? 
33. Indicators of social capital 
a. Do you think that there is all round erosion of local leadership and authority in recent years? 
Why do you say this? 
Decrease in interdependence among households 
Increase in intra-village conflict 
Decrease in participation in common welfare activities 
Decrease in village meetings (Oor kootam \ Oor panchayat) 
Decrease in Oor kattupaddu 
Increase in open political affiliation and consequent division among households 
Increase in migration 
Give reasons: 
Are there any members in the state-level \ District level farmers' association ? Yes \ No 
If so, how many farmers? 
Is there a system of exchange labour in the village ? Yes / no 
If yes, extent 
-\/ No. of households engaged in exchange of labour 
'i In which season and for which operations 
4 Is there a decline in this system in recent years? 
Is there any hiring in \ hiring out of bullock pair for ploughing within the village 
If yes , extent: 
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APPENDIX 2 
Analysis of Interrelationship between Poverty, Private Property and Common Property 
Natural Resource Management in South India 
(Research Project funded by the South Asian Network for Development and Environmental 
Economics, Nepal) 
Principal investigator: R.Balasubramanian, Associate Professor 
Department of Agricultural Economics 
Tamil Nadu Agricultural University 
Coimbatore 641 003 
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Questionnaire for Household Survey 
PART I (Production) 
1. General particulars 
Name of the village: 
Name of the block: 
Name of the respondent: 
2. Family particulars 
Code 
S. No Relation to 
head 
Age Sex Educational status 
Mention exact 
std./class up to 
which the family 
member has studied 
Occupation 
Primary Secondary 
3. Land holdings 
4. Assets other than land 
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S.No 
. 





(State whether all 
the lands are 
located in the 
same village / 
different villages) 
Wet Garden Dry 
1 Owned 
2 Leased in 
3 Leased out 
4 Mortgage in 
5 Mortgage out 







1. Farm machinery & implements 
a) Tractor 
b) Power tiller 
c) Tractor drawn implements 
d) Pump-set 
e) Bullock cart 
f) Thresher 
g) Other implements 
2. Farm buildings (Threshing 
floor/storage godown) 
3. House Type : Thatched/tiled/RCC 
4. Television (Colour / B&W) 
5. Radio 
6. Two wheelers (Mention type) 
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Si. 
No 
Particulars No Income from sale of milk 
/ hire charges received 
from draught animals / 
income from poultry 
Present value of 
animals 
1. Draught animals 
2. Mitch animals 
a.Desi-Cow 
b.Buffaloes 
c. Hi-bred cow 
3. Calves and Heifers 
(Below 1 year) 
4. Sheep and goat 
5. Poultry 
S.No. Crops 1998-99 1999-2000 2000-01 Remarks 
(Reasons for 
crop failure if 
any) 

















7. Coping mechanisms 
a) Particulars of salary income for the household 
b) In come from self-employment 
c) Employment pattern in and income from informal sector 
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1 Government employees in the 
family 
2. Private sector employees in the 
family 
3 Business 
Nature of self 
employment 





Income / month Income per 
year 
a) Petty business 
b) Charcoal making 






























1 Head of the family 




d) Out - migration details 
e) Other coping mechanisms 
If none of the above coping mechanisms (business/non-agri. employment/migration) are 
followed, then how do you manage the failure of agriculture? Briefly explain. 
Do you resort to borrowing to meet consumption expenditure? Yes / No 
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Male Female Age Wage 
rate 





8. Particulars of wells and water market 
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S.No Particulars Tank command Non-tank command (garden land) 
Well 1 Well 2 Well 1 Well 2 
1 Year of digging 
2 Cost of digging 
3 Year of deepening 
4 Cost of deepening 
5 Type of well (open, 
open-cum-bore, 
bore) 
6 Present depth 
7 Type of lift (electric 
motor, diesel 
engine) 
8 Capacity (HP) 
9 Duration of 
pumping in hours 
per day 
a) Normal year 
b) Dry year 
10 Crops irrigated 
(acres) 
a) Normal year 
b) Dry year 
11 Water level in the 
well in feet 
a) Tank season 
b) Non-tank season 
12 Extent of 




a) Normal year 
b) Dry year 
9. Participation in tank maintenance activities 




Uncertainty in tank-water supply 
No financial resources in the village for tank maintenance activities 
Non-participation by well-owners 
People have resorted to non-agricultural employment / migration, so the villagers are not 
interested in tanks 
Others (specify) 
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Nature of activity Latest year (2000-2001) Year before latest year (1999-2000) 
















a) Cleaning & 
repairing the supply 
channel 
b) Diverting and 
bringing more water 
to your supply 
channel 
c) Lobbying with 
upstream farmers to 
bring more water to 
your tank 
d) Desilting the tank 
e) Removal of 
encroachment 
f) Cleaning field 
channel which 
brings water to your 
field 
g) Lobbying with 
PU / PWD for 
repairing the tank 
k) Others (Mention) 
11. Crop-wise cost and returns from crop cultivated in the tank ayacut 
(2000-2001) 










Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value 
A Irrigation Particulars 
1) Frequency of irrigation 
2) Number of irrigations actually 
given to the crop 
3) Hours to irrigate the crop one 
time for the entire area 
4) Height of water-level in the 
field 
5) Who irrigated the field 
(Neerkatti / farmer himself) 
B. Cost Particulars 
1) Human labour used 
(man days) 
i) Nursery raising 
a) Family labour 
b) Hired labour 
ii) Preparatory tillage 
a) Family labour 
b) Hired labour 
iii) Weeding 
a) Family labour 
b) Hired labour 
iv) Harvesting 
a) Family labour 
b) Hired labour 
v) Transport 
a) Family labour 
b) Hired labour 
2) Bullock labour 
(bullock pair days) 
3) Machine hours 
4) Seeds / planting material 
5) Manure (cart loads) 
















Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value 
7) Plant protection chemicals 
a) Liquid (mUlitres) 
b) Dust (kg) 
8) Transport, packing, marketing 
costs 
9) Main product yield (mention 
the units of measurement) 
10) Price of main product 
11) By product (mention the units 
of measurement) 
A Irrigation Particulars 
1) Frequency of irrigation 
2) Number of irrigations actually 
given to the crop 
3) Hours to irrigate the crop one 
time for the entire area 
4) Height of water level 
5) Who inigated the field 
(Neerkatti / farmer himself) 
B. Cost Particulars 
1) Human labour used 
(man days) 
i) Nursery raising 
a) Family labour 
b) Hired labour 
ii) Preparatory tillage 
a) Family labour 
b) Hired labour 
iii) Weeding 
a) Family labour 
b) Hired labour 
iv) Harvesting 
a) Family labour 
b) Hired labour 
v) Transport 
a) Family labour 
b) Hired labour 
1) Bullock labour (bp days) 
2) Machine hours 
3) Seeds / planting material 











Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value 






7) Plant protection chemicals 
a) Liquid (ml/litres) 
b) Dust (kg) 
8) Transport, packing, marketing 
costs 
9) Main product yield (Kgs / 
qntls / tonnes / baskets ) 
10) Price of main product 
11) By product (Kgs / 
qntls / tonnes/ baskets ) 
A. IRRIGATION PARTICULARS_ 
1) Frequency of irrigation 
2) Number of irrigations actually 
given to the crop 
3) Hours to irrigate the crop 
one time for the entire area 
4) Height of water level 
5) Who irrigated the field 
(Neerkatti / farmer himself) 
B. COST PARTICULARS 
6) Human labour used 
(man days) 
i) Nursery raising 
a) Family labour 
b) Hired labour 
ii) Preparatory tillage 
a) Family labour 
b) Hired labour 
iii) Weeding 
a) Family labour 
b) Hired labour 
iv) Harvesting 
a) Family labour 
b) Hired labour 
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Contd. 










Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value 
y) Transport 
a) Family labour 
b) Hired labour 
7) Bullock labour (bp days) 
8) Machine hours 
9) Seeds / planting material 
10) Manure (cart loads) 






12) Plant protection chemicals 
a) Liquid (ml/litres) 
b) Dust (kg) 
13) Transport, packing, 
marketing costs 
14) Main product yield (Kgs / 
qntls / tonnes / baskets ) 
15) Price of main product 
16) By product (Kgs / qntls / 
tonnes/ baskets ) 
11 Contd... Crop-wise cost and returns from crop cultivated in the tank ayacut 
(Use separate sheets for each crop) 










Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value 
A. Irrigation Particulars 
1) Frequency of irrigation 
2) Number of irrigations actually 
given to the crop 
3 Hours to irrigate the crop one 
time for the entire area 
4) Water level in the field 
5) Who irrigated the field 
(Neerkatti / farmer himself) 
Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value 
B. COST PARTICULARS 
6) Human labour used 
(man days) 
i) Nursery raising 
a) Family labour 
b) Hired labour 
ii) Preparatory tillage 
a) Family labour 
b) Hired labour 
iii) Weeding 
a) Family labour 
b) Hired labour 
iv) Harvesting 
a) Family labour 
b) Hired labour 
v) Transport 
a) Family labour 
b) Hired labour 
1) Bullock labour 
(bp days) 
2) Machine hours 
3) Seeds / planting material 
4) Manure (cart loads) 
















Quantity Value Quantity Value Quantity Value 
12) Plant protection chemicals 
a) Liquid (ml/litres) 
b) Dust (kg) 
13) Transport, packing, marketing 
costs 
14) Main product yield (Kgs / 
qntls / tonnes / baskets ) 
15) Price of main product 
16) By product (Kgs / qntls / 
tonnes/ baskets ) 
12. A. Economics of crops on lands other than tank-irrigated land (1999-00) 
B. Economics of crops on lands other than tank-irrigated land (2000-2001) 







Season I Season II Season III 
Acre output Net 
income 
Acre Output Net 
income 
















Season I Season II Season III 
Acre output Net 
income 
Acre Output Net 
income 










PART H (Consumption) 
13. Quantity consumed of various food items (Three day recall method) 
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13. Periodicity of consumption 
14. Other consumption expenditure 
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Particulars Male Female Children Remarks 





Expenditure items Expenditure 
(Rs./month) 
If the expenditure 









4.Cooking gas (LPG) 
5.Electricity 
6.Telephone 
7.Celebraiton of festival 
8.Entertainment (Cinema, 
Cable TV charges, etc.) 
9.Dressing 
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